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Abstract 
A probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is being developed for a steam-methane reforming hydrogen production plant linked to a high-temperature 
gas-cooled nuclear reactor (HTGR). This work is based on the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute's (JAERI) High Temperature Engineering 
Test Reactor (HTTR) prototype in Japan. The objective of this paper is to show how the PSA can be used for improving the design of the coupled 
plants. A simplified HAZOP study was performed to identify initiating events, based on existing studies. The results of the PSA show that the 
average frequency of an accident at this complex that could affect the population is 7 x 10~8 year-1 which is divided into the various end states. 
The dominant sequences are those that result in a methane explosion and occur with a frequency of 6.5 x 10"8 year"1, while the other sequences 
are much less frequent. The health risk presents itself if there are people in the vicinity who could be affected by the explosion. This analysis also 
demonstrates that an accident in one of the plants has little effect on the other. This is true given the design base distance between the plants, the 
fact that the reactor is underground, as well as other safety characteristics of the HTGR. 
1. Introduction 
The increase in world population and consequently in energy 
demand, the progressive decrease in the fossil fuel reserves, 
and the environmental pollution associated with the combustion, 
have attracted the attention of researchers toward the search for 
new energy alternatives. Hydrogen is one of these and has lots 
of advantage for the environment. It is a clean fuel when burned 
with air produces non-contaminating emissions. In addition to 
direct combustion, work has begun in developing technologies 
based on fuel cells to transform chemical energy to electric 
energy and steam. Hydrogen and fuel cells have the poten-
tial to solve several major challenges facing the world today: 
dependence on fossil fuels, poor air quality and greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
Hydrogen can make an effective contribution to the reduction 
of the greenhouse gas emissions, in particular in the transport 
and power generation sectors. In fact, developed countries have 
a high dependency on gasoline use in transportation, and devel-
oping countries are heading in the same direction. Changing 
gasoline and diesel-based transportation into hydrogen fuel will 
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result in a tremendous improvement in the energy conversion 
efficiency. Vehicles burning gasoline and diesel are noticeably 
inefficient: North American cars are about 15% efficient, new 
European cars are close to 25% efficient, meanwhile fuel cells 
burning hydrogen, although still in their first stage of develop-
ment, already achieve over 50% efficiency (Miller and Duffey, 
2005). 
Hydrogen is not a primary energy source like coal and 
gas; it is an energy carrier. Initially, it will be produced using 
existing energy systems based on different conventional pri-
mary energy carriers and sources. Hydrogen produced from 
fossil-based energy conversion systems with capture, and safe 
storage (sequestration) of CO2 emissions, is almost a com-
pletely carbon-free energy pathway. In the longer term, renew-
able (solar, wind, biomass, etc.) and nuclear energy sources 
will become the most important source for the production of 
hydrogen. 
Presently the two main processes to produce hydrogen are: 
steam-methane reforming and electrolysis. The former is now 
dominantly used worldwide to produce hydrogen, mainly due to 
its economic advantage over electrolysis. Most hydrogen pro-
duction today is produced by steam-methane reformers typically 
in world-scale plants producing 200-300 tonnes/day. This scale 
of plant produces enough hydrogen to fuel around half a mil-
lion light vehicles (Miller, 2004). Other advanced technologies, 
like high temperature electrolysis and thermochemical cycles 
are under development worldwide. 
Hydrogen produced from nuclear energy conversion sys-
tems is under investigation around the world, most of them 
based on steam-methane reforming, electrolysis, thermochem-
ical cycles and high temperature electrolysis. In particular the 
Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) is developing 
a prototype plant to demonstrate the feasibility of hydrogen pro-
duction under the steam-methane reforming process coupled to 
a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor: the High Temperature 
Engineering Test Reactor (HTTR). 
Therefore, the safety of the three components of the complex 
should be analyzed: the hydrogen plant, the nuclear reactor and 
the coupling of the two. When handled properly, hydrogen is 
a very safe fuel. However, like all fuels, hydrogen has energy 
and must be treated with respect. The recent high-temperature 
gas-cooled reactors are promising to be very safe; however, the 
use of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) and risk-informed 
design can increase safety even further. One of the most impor-
tant limitations of the study is the lack of operational experience; 
however, generic data is employed for these analyses and the 
results are useful in the design phase. The HTTR in Japan was 
used as a basis for the study since the necessary information 
of the plant was available. Although the HTTR is in operation, 
the chemical plant will be not put into operation until 2008. 
For this reason the generic data were used and will be described 
throughout the paper. Since ranking is a useful output from PSA, 
we will observe that the actual values are not as important as the 
relative ranking of the importance of the components to safety. 
To do this, initiating events were postulated by development of 
a HAZOP study based on the JAERI installation in Japan. The 
approach of this study was to identify and quantify health risks 
in order to And key points for improvement. 
The required information was gathered from publicly avail-
able documents in order to describe the systems and components 
of the HTTR (JAERI, 2005). The P&UJs of the plant were devel-
oped based on the information available (Inagaki et al., 2003). 
Generic failure rates were used in the analysis. The chemical 
plant component failure rates were taken from Guidelines for 
Process Equipment Reliability Data with Data Tables (AICHE, 
1989), and the nuclear component failure rates from the PRA 
Procedure's Guide (Bari et al., 1985) and a study on operational 
experience at a high-temperature gas-cooled nuclear reactor 
(HTGR), Fort St. Vrain (Copinger and Moses, 2004). 
Initiating events were postulated based on a HAZOP type 
study on the JAERI installation in Japan. Because the idea was 
to identify and quantify health risks in order to And key points for 
improvement, event trees were constructed for three initiating 
events that could most impact public health (see items 3, 8 and 
11 in Table 1). Since the objective of this paper is to show how 
the PSA can be used for improving the design of the coupled 
plants, it is necessary to present possible accident sequences, the 
end states or consequences and their frequencies. It was possible 
to deAne different end states; not all result in explosion or some 
kind of effect on health, as some are purely economic damage to 
the plant. With this information it was possible to determine the 
components that contribute most to the accidents and perform 
various sensitivity studies in order to determine how to reduce 
the frequency of the events. 
2. Description of the complex 
It is necessary to fully understand the design of the plants 
that constitute the complex and their safety systems in order 
to be able to develop the event trees and reAect in them the 
chronology of the actuation of the mitigating systems. Complete 
knowledge about the components of the safety systems is also 
crucial to the development of the fault trees and data base. Given 
the limited information available, assumptions were made when 
necessary and are indicated as such throughout the paper. A 
brief description is provided of the HTTR and the hydrogen 
production, which uses the methane reforming process. 
2.1. Main HTTR safety systems 
One of the main characteristics of HTTR safety is the fuel 
design, which consists of coated fuel particles (CFP's) that 
should not fail during normal operation and anticipated oper-
ational occurrences (AOO's). Among the safety characteristics 
of the reactor are the following: the maximum fuel tempera-
ture does not exceed 1600 °C in any AOO. The reactor will be 
shut down in a safe and reliable way during operation using a 
control rod system. In addition, the reserve shutdown system 
(RSS) is independent of the control rod system. Another system 
is designed to remove decay heat after reactor shutdown for any 
AOO or accident. The HTTR has a containment vessel to pre-
vent a release of Assion products (FP's) and an excessive ingress 
of air in the case of a depressurization accident. The pressure in 
the pressurized water cooling system (PWCS) will be controlled 
and will have less pressure than that of the primary helium to 
prevent a large ingress of water into the core in case of a heat 
exchanger tube rupture in the pressurized primary water cooler 
(PPWC). The pressure of the helium in the secondary helium 
cooling system (SHCS) will be slightly higher than the primary 
to prevent release of Assion products, from the primary cool-
ing system (PCS) to the secondary, through a break in the heat 
exchanger (IHX) pipe. A full description of the HTTR can be 
found in the JAERI website (JAERI, 2005). 
In order to couple the plants, the secondary pressurized water 
cooler is removed and the high temperature helium is sent to the 
chemical plant. Two isolation valves are added outside the con-
tainment in order to be able to isolate the plants when necessary. 
2.2. Description of the chemical plant 
2.2.1. Description of the methane reforming process 
One of the most efficient and economic ways to generate 
hydrogen is by the methane reforming process, although the use 
of this method generates carbon dioxide, the production of this 
greenhouse gas is reduced by almost 22% when using a nuclear 
reactor as the heat source (Flores et al., 2004). The methane 
reforming method consists of breaking the link between the car-
bon and the hydrogen in the methane, with the help of heat and 
Table 1 
HAZOP action report 
Guide word Possible cause Consequences Suggested action 
1 
2 
3 
Less flow 
Less flow 
Less flow 
Process gas leak 
(hydrogen) 
Helium line break in the 
reformer 
Helium return line leak 
4 
5 
Less flow 
Less pressure 
Loss of feedwater 
Loss of pressure accident 
nitrogen pipe break 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
Less flow 
Corrosion 
Less pressure 
Less flow 
Less flow 
Less flow 
Methane line break 
(methane) 
Reformer tube leak 
Helium duct rupture 
VCS water line break 
ACS pressurized water 
line 
PPWC tube break 
Accumulation of explosive mixture (in an 
enclosed place) 
Loss of coolant, over heating of the heat 
exchanger 
Temperature increase in the heat exchanger, 
temperature increase in the primary Helium 
circuit 
Thermal rupture of the methane, carbon 
accumulation in the reformer tubes 
If normal shutdown is required, the nitrogen 
could not be used to purge the line and the 
methane would have to be vented, possible 
damage to catalyst due to steam 
condensation. The plant cannot start up 
without this line 
Accumulation of flammable mixture and 
possible explosion 
Contamination 
Loss of coolant, FP release, oxidation of 
internal graphite structures in the core 
Heating of the concrete wall around the 
reactor vessel 
This system does not function during 
operation, in case of an emergency shutdown 
ACS can be used, if the break is in the AHX, 
the water could enter the reactor core 
Loss of coolant to PPWC, temperature 
increase. If the break is inside the PPWC, 
water can ingress to the core, increase in 
reactivity, oxidation of internal graphite 
structures, fission product release, possible 
production of hydrogen inside the reactor 
and explosion 
Detector. Relief valves in the 
containment 
Sensors to detect a leak. Helium 
cutoff to the feed gas circuit 
Flow detectors, reactor shutdown, 
isolation valve closure, feedgas 
and water closure, activation of 
auxiliary cooling system, vents 
Feedwater backup system 
Leak detectors and pressure 
controllers, vents to chimney 
Appropriate detection devices, 
sufficient distance between 
plants, wall to absorb explosion, 
isolation valves 
Material research 
Fission product release barriers, 
air purification system, isolation 
of the containment 
Level, flow and pressure detectors 
Flow and pressure detectors, 
backup system to ACS 
Isolation valves for feedwater to 
PWCS, pressure detectors 
steam, this causes the carbon to oxidize generating carbon diox-
ide and hydrogen. 
The methane reforming process is the following: natural gas 
is injected and passes through a desulfurizer to reduce the pro-
duction of SOx, once the level of sulfur in the natural gas is 
reduced, it is mixed with superheated steam and enters the 
reformer where carbon monoxide and hydrogen are produced. 
More water is added to the resulting mixture to generate more 
hydrogen and generate carbon dioxide, which is less contami-
nating than carbon monoxide; this reaction takes place in a shift 
reactor. A modular representation of the process is shown in 
Fig. 1. 
A diagram was constructed on the basis of available infor-
mation about the coupling of the HTTR and the steam methane 
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Fig. 1. Methane reforming process. 
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Fig. 2. Coupling of HTTR and methane reforming plant. 
reforming plant and is presented in Fig. 2. The development of 
the initiating events and the accident sequences is based on this 
diagram. 
3. Initiating events and accident sequences 
In order to identify initiating events, a table was developed to 
describe the possible consequences due to deviations in the nor-
mal operation of the plants, as is done in the HAZOP technique. 
The information was taken from studies on the HTTR as well as 
events that have occurred in HTGRs (basically Fort St. Vrain) 
and hydrogen plants. Due to the fact that many of the operational 
deviations lead to purely economic damage, these initiators were 
not included in the event tree analysis presented here. Further 
work is being performed on other initiators in order to include 
them in the design improvement process proposed here. 
3.1. HAZOP 
The diagram in Fig. 2 was divided into systems, and different 
guide words were applied to discover the possible consequences 
of that particular deviation from normal operation. The helium 
lines were separated into three subsystems: that which leaves the 
reactor towards the main cooling system (MCS), that which goes 
to the auxiliary cooling system (ACS) and the secondary helium 
loop that exits the heat exchanger and heads to the chemical 
plant. Table 1 shows the compilation of information presented 
in the HAZOP action report format. 
After analyzing each system line with the aid of this HAZOP 
format, the events were chosen based on their effect on public 
health, resulting in three events: methane line break, the helium 
duct rupture and PPWC heat exchanger tube break, which cor-
respond to the events 6, 8 and 11 in Table 1. The initiating event 
(number 6 in the table) corresponds to a methane pipe break 
and could result in consequences such as explosion and Are, the 
initiating event 8 corresponds to a rupture in the primary helium 
duct that could result in loss of coolant in the reactor and fission 
product release and Anally, the event 11 is due to a PPWC heat 
exchanger tube break which could result in an ingress of water 
to the reactor core that could produce hydrogen in the core and 
lead to a hydrogen explosion. Each of these failures was pos-
tulated in the location that would cause the most damage. The 
event trees for each of these initiators are presented below. 
3.2. Accident sequences 
Event trees are used to model the possible accident sequences 
given a speciAc initiating event. Since the three initiating events 
are very different it was necessary to build three different event 
trees to model them. To do this, the items in the suggested action 
column can be incorporated as mitigating systems, as well as the 
existing mitigating systems. Also, mitigating systems from each 
of the plants must be involved when possible, in order to observe 
the effect of the deviation from normal operation on the other 
plant. 
3.2.1. Methane pipe break (RU-ME) 
A value of 2.35 x 1(T4 year"1 (AICHE, 1989) was used for 
the initiating event frequency; this event was chosen due to the 
fact that methane is potentially explosive and could cause sub-
stantial damage to onsite personnel as well as to the general 
public. 
The event considered is a total break in the methane piping in 
the place that would cause the most damage and with the least 
possibility of preventing the explosion. There is a nominal Aow 
of 1400 kg/h that leaks from the pipe; it is assumed that the only 
way to stop the Aow in this location is by stopping the pump 
BM01 (see Fig. 3). 
3.2.2. Location and description of the break 
This event considers a break in the methane pipe as shown in 
Fig. 3; the break is located between the evaporator EMOl and 
the pressure control valve VCPM02. When a pressure difference 
is detected, a signal is sent to stop the pump BM01, while all the 
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Fig. 3. Location of methane pipe break. 
Table 2 
End states for initiating event RU-ME 
Table 3 
System failure probabilities for RU-ME 
End state Description System Failure probability 
EXPLOSIONMa 
DTP 
DTQ 
Methane explosion 
Possible structural damage 
Thermal damage to the chemical plant 
a
 The quantity of gas accumulated will depend on the time to repair the pump 
BM01; calculations revealed that more than 200 kg of methane would accumu-
late in 10 min, and if it were to ignite it could cause second degree burns after 
20 s of exposition to people located 100 m from the center of the fire (Flores, 
2005). 
helium from the reactor is sent to the PPWC. If for some reason 
the flow cannot be diverted or a SCRAM must be initiated, the 
PPWC is designed to dissipate the 30 MW from the reactor. 
If there is a SCRAM in an accident condition, the MCS, 
which consists of the PPWC and IHX, stops and the ACS starts 
in order to remove the decay heat from the reactor, the operating 
vessel cooling system (VCS) also helps ro remove heat. In these 
event trees we consider the possibility of the VCS to fail to 
continue operating; however, even if the VCS stops during the 
accident condition, a concrete biological shield around the VCS 
can absorb the heat from the core. The VCS failure will not cause 
the core to melt like the ECCS failure in a light water reactor. 
Despite this, the end state DTP is included to determine whether 
further study is necessary on any kind of structural damage that 
could be caused when the active cooling sytems fail. The VCS 
failure is not considered when there is a failure to shutdown, due 
to the very small resulting probability. 
3.2.3. Results for the initiating event RU-ME 
Fig. 4 presents the event tree that was built for this initiating 
event using the computer program, S APHIRE, developed by the 
Idaho National Laboratory (Russell and Hoffman, 1998). 
Table 2 presents the definition of the possible end states for 
the event tree presented in Fig. 4. Although the last two of the end 
states do not cause health effects, they are considered because 
of the economic effect that they imply due to plant damage. 
Fault trees were constructed to be able to calculate the fre-
quencies of the sequences, one for each mitigating system shown 
in the headings of the event trees. The level of detail in the fault 
VCS 
ACS 
DESV 
META 
APAG 
9.84 x 10"3 
6.59 x 10"3 
2.54 x 10"4 
2.53 x 10"4 
5.10 x lO" 6 
trees reached the component level, and their power supply was 
considered as a support system; other support systems were not 
considered due to the lack of detailed enough information. The 
failure of the power supply as an initiating event has been ana-
lyzed and was not found to be a dominant contributor to the 
consequences. 
The fault trees are not presented in this paper, they can be 
found in the full report (Flores, 2005). The fault trees were built 
and quantified with SAPHIRE also. The failure rates for each 
component were obtained from various references, including 
the PRA Procedures Guide (Bari et al., 1985) and the Guide for 
reliability data in the process industry (AICHE, 1989). Data for 
the failure of the operator to shut down the reactor and the failure 
of the insertion of the control rods were taken from the report on 
the operational experience in Fort St. Vrain, a high-temperature 
gas-cooled reactor that operated in the United States for 10 years 
(Copinger and Moses, 2004). 
The fault trees are used to calculate the probability of failure 
of each system; Table 3 shows the results of the failure proba-
bility for each system involved in the event tree for the initiating 
event RU-ME. 
Once the fault trees were evaluated, the frequencies of 
the accident sequences were quantified. The sequences were 
grouped by end states in order to evaluate the frequencies 
of the possible consequences for this event. The results for 
all the end states considered in this paper are shown in Sec-
tion 4. In particular, the results for this event tree show a 
mean frequency of 6.53 x 10 - 8 year -1 for a methane explosion, 
2.60 x 10 - 7 year -1 for DTP, and 3.15 x 10 - 1 3 year -1 for DTQ, 
the last two end states represent only economic loss due to some 
type of structural damage. 
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Fig. 4. Event tree for the initiating event RU-ME. 
Table 4 
End states for helium duct break 
Helium duct break 
Fig. 5. Location of the helium pipe break RU-HE. 
3.3. Helium duct rupture (RU-HE) 
This event is considered the worst event by the HTTR design-
ers, and is referred to as a depressurization accident. It consists 
of a total rupture of the coaxial pipe that goes to the PPWC and 
the heat exchanger (IHX). This break could cause the coolant to 
flow out of the pressurized vessel and leave the reactor without 
coolant, in such a way that the ACS would not be available and 
the only way to remove the residual heat is with the VCS. 
3.3.1. Description of the helium duct break 
A frequency of 2.12 x 10 - 5year - 1 is considered for this 
large break (Russell and Hoffman, 1998) and it is localized in 
the inlet nozzle of the pressurized vessel, as illustrated in Fig. 5. 
When the pressure difference is detected, a SCRAM occurs and 
DTP 
FP 
DT 
Possible structural damage 
Fission product release through the service areaa 
Structural damageb 
a
 The sources of FP considered in the analysis are: FP in the primary coolant, 
FP that plate out on the primary coolant system and FP contained in the core 
which could be liberated during an accident. 
b
 The HTTR is designed to have a negative feedback due to the Doppler effect 
of the fuel, thus there is no fuel damage since 1600 °C will not be surpassed. 
Table 5 
System failure 
System 
VCS 
AGUA-PPWC 
CV-VALV 
APAG 
probabilities 
Failure probability 
9.84 x 10"3 
4.47 x 10"3 
2.75 x 10"4 
5.10 x lO" 6 
the coolant may be released to the containment. The containment 
isolation valves must close to avoid release of fission products, 
although a small quantity may leak to the atmosphere through 
the service area due to the increase in the containment pres-
sure. The ACS cannot operate under these conditions to prevent 
the entrance of air into the core. The decay heat is removed by 
the VCS. When the pressure inside the core and the mixture of 
helium/air is the same, air may enter by natural convection and 
oxidize the graphite structures until the VCS cools the reactor 
and the oxidation reaction stops. Again, failure of the VCS to 
continue operating is not considered when there is a failure to 
scram due to the low resulting probability. 
3.3.2. Results for helium duct break RU-HE 
By failing the mitigating systems that could enter to avoid 
possible accident consequences, it was possible to create the 
event tree presented in Fig. 6. The system entitled CV-VALV, 
the containment isolation valves, avoids the liberation of fission 
products out of the vessel containment. The end states for this 
initiating event are shown in Table 4. 
The failure probabilities for the systems are shown in Table 5. 
The system CV-VALV is responsible for the closure of 
the containment isolation valve to avoid fission product 
Rupture of primary 
concentric hot gas 
duct at the RPV 
inlet nozzle 
RU-HE 
Reactor 
Shutdown 
APAG 
Containment 
isolation valve 
closed 
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1 
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Fig. 6. Event tree for the initiating event RU-HE. 
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Fig. 7. Location of the break RU-PPWC. 
release. Due to the low frequency of this initiating event, 
2.12 x 10~5 year-1,1 FP is a low frequency end state, as can 
be seen in Section 4. In this case the systems in the chemical 
plant are not included in the event tree, because it is assumed that 
the isolation valves between the two plants close. This assump-
tion will be changed in future work by including the possibility 
of these valves failing. 
3.4. Rupture of apipe in the PPWC (RU-PPWC) 
This initiating event is assumed to have a frequency of 
5 x 10~4 year -1 (Bari et al., 1985) and is considered important 
because if a large amount of water were to enter into the reactor, 
first there is a probability that the internal graphite structures 
could be oxidized and if the reactor is not shut down, hydrogen 
would be produced in the core, possibly resulting in an explo-
sion. 
Table 6 
End states for RU-PPWC 
DTP 
OXGRAF 
EXPLOSIONH2 
EXPLOSIONH2-FP 
Partial structural damage 
This refers to the oxidation of the graphite given the 
ingress of water into the reactor 
Hydrogen explosion in the vessel, given the 
accumulation of hydrogen in the core 
Similar to the above, but the containment is not 
isolated in this case and fission products are released 
to the environment 
the reactivity. A SCRAM occurs when a decrease is detected in 
the pressure between the primary helium gas and the pressur-
ized water. Simultaneously, the PPWC is isolated from the water 
pump by closing an isolation valve to prevent an even greater 
ingress of water into the reactor core. Again, the systems in the 
chemical plant are assumed to be unaffected by the event. 
3.4.1. Location and description of the event RU-PPWC 
In the case of a break in a heat exchanger pipe inside the 
PPWC (see Fig. 7), the pressurized water could enter into the 
primary helium loop and if so would evaporate given the heat 
of the structures in the reactor. The water that enters inside the 
core could cause oxidation of the graphite, as well as increase 
3.4.2. Results for the event RU-PPWC 
The event tree was developed for the PPWC heat exchanger 
pipe break and is presented in Fig. 8, and the end states are shown 
in Table 6. 
4. General results 
1
 A large LOCA was assumed, given no data was found for this type concentric Table 7 shows the failure probability of each system and 
pipe break. Table 8 shows the frequency of each end state in descending 
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Fig. 8. Event tree for the initiating event RU-PPWC. 
Table 7 
Probability of system failure 
Fault Tree Review - (HTTR-H2) ms 
Fault Tree 
J VCS 
| ACS 
J AGUA-PPWC 
j CV-VALV 
J DESV 
| META 
| APAG 
Frequency 
1.Ü15E-02 
8.452E-03 
4.672E-03 
2.828E-04 
2780E-04 
273ÜE-Ü4 
4.816E-06 
Mean 
9.843E-Ü3 
6.587E-03 
4.470E-Ü3 
2.752E-Ü4 
2.538E-04 
2.538E-Ü4 
5.096E-06 
5th 
4.579E-03 
1.974E-03 
1.285E-03 
1.781E-05 
1.345E-05 
1.345E-05 
4.158E-07 
Median 
8.872É-03 
4.982E-03 
3.352E-03 
1.466E-04 
1.183E-Ü4 
1.183E-04 
2.335E-06 
95th 
1.847E-G2¡ 
1.523E-02| 
1.155E-02| 
8.813E-04J 
9.473E-04| 
9,473E-04| 
1 951E-051 
order, including the end states that represent economic loss only 
(OXGRAF, DTP, DT and DTQ) with the largest probabilities. 
The point value, mean, 5 and 95% values are shown here as 
calculated in the uncertainty analysis. 
From Table 7 we can observe that the system with the greatest 
failure probability is the VCS. Although the VCS has the largest 
failure probability, it is not the system that contributes most to 
Table 8 
All end state frequencies 
EndState Review - (HTTR-H2) f ? J ® 
End State 
| | OXGRAF 
I I DTP | j EXPLOSiONM 
I I FP DT 
OXGRAF-DTP 
| | FP-DTP 
| I EXPLOSIONH2 
| | FP-DT 
| | DTQ 
| I EXPLQSIONH2-FP 
| I EXPLOSIONM-DTP 
| j EXPLOSIONM-DTQ 
| TOTALS = 
Frequency 
2.336E-Ü6 
2.596E-07 
5,533E-08 
5.996E-09 
2 51ÜE-09 
2.082E-10 
6.108E-11 
1.127E-11 
7.100E-13 
3.147E-13 
3.186E-1S 
1.617E-15 
8.74SE-17 
2.670E-06 
Mean 
2.215E-06 
2.463E-Ü7 
5.58CIE-08 
5.571 E-09 
2.410E-0S 
1 .782E-10 
5.775E-11 
1.120E-11 
3.922E-13 
3.248E-13 
3.129E-1S 
1 706E-15 
8.782E-17 
2.536E-Ü6 
5th 
6 559E-Ü7 
1.112E-Ü7 
3.473E-Ü9 
3.878E-10 
2.330E-10 
2.127E-11 
3.237E-12 
4.849E-13 
1.237E-14 
4.790E-15 
2.748E-17 
7.4B2E-13 
2.348E-19 
Median 
1 773E-06 
2.155E-07 
2.762E-08 
2.788E-09 
1 171 E-09 
9 977E-11 
2.463E-11 
4.153E-12 
1.707E-13 
7.313E-14 
5.445E-16 
1 790E-16 
8.114E-18 
95th 
5.206E-06 
4.321 E-07 
2.300E-07 
2.039E-08 
8 295E-09 
5.335E-10 
1.929E-10 
4.558E-11 
2.916E-12 
1.292E-12 
1.423E-14 
5 345E-15 
2.598E-1S 
the end state frequency. The system that contributes most to an 
accident that affects health is the methane system (META). The 
failure or success of the VCS affects the economical aspects 
more than the health risk. 
In Table 8 we can observe that the end state with the highest 
frequency is the oxidation of the graphite (OXGRAF), which 
refers to the oxidation of the internal graphite structures in the 
reactor pressure vessel, again, a purely economic risk end state. 
Observing Table 9 we find three end states that provoke 
damage to the onsite, and possibly offsite, population: EXPLO-
SIONM, EXPLOSIONH2, FP and these same ocurrences but 
with different extensions added, such as DT, DTP, and DTQ. 
Table 9 shows only the end states that could have an effect on 
the population in terms of death and injury. The mean frequency 
is 6.991 xlO-Syear-1 . 
5. Design improvement methodology: importance and 
sensitivity studies 
There are various importance measures used in PSA, for 
this study we use the risk reduction importance, that is, the 
amount of reduction in the frequency of the end states when 
the basic event being considered is reduced to a probability of 0. 
For example, the frequency of the end state EXPLOSIONM is 
about 6.5 x 10 - 8 year-1; if it were necessary to reduce this fre-
quency, it is useful to rank the importance of the components that 
are involved in these sequences. It was found that the methane 
Table 9 
Frequency of end states that affect health 
EndState Review - (HTTR-H2) 
End State 
EXPLOSIONM 
FP 
FP-DTP 
EXPLOSIONH2 
FP-DT 
EXPLOSIONH2-FP 
EXPLOSIONM-DTP 
EXPLOSIONM-DTQ 
TOTALS = 
Frequency 
6.S33E-08 
5.996E-09 
6.108E-11 
1.127E-11 
7.100E-13 
3.186E-15 
1.617E-15 
8.748E-17 
7.140E-08 
Mean 
6.420E-08 
5.634E-09 
6.609E-11 
1.208E-11 
6.887E-13 
2.802E-15 
1.351E-15 
1.170E-16 
6.991 E-08 
5th 
3.620E-09 
3.821 E-10 
3.329E-12 
5.289E-13 
9.135E-15 
2.798E-17 
8.714E-18 
2.870E-19 
4.00 3E-09 
Median 
3.198E-08 
2.561 E-09 
2.602E-11 
4.126E-12 
1.534E-13 
5.952E-16 
2.044E-16 
9.393E-18 
3.4 5 7 E-08 
95th 
2.194E-07 
1.993E-08 
2.393E-10 
4.400E-11 
2.747E-12 
1.143E-14 
5.143E-15 
3.048E-16 
2.396E-07 
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Fig. 9. Cutoff valve VCM-A added to the design. 
pump BMOl contributes most to this frequency, since the failure 
to stop this pump results in an accumulation of methane at the 
place of the break. Given the design,2 there is no way to detain 
the methane flow if the pump is not stopped. For this reason, sev-
eral modifications were suggested to study their impact on the 
end state frequency. One suggestion was to place a cutoff valve 
before the evaporator, shown as VCM-A in Fig. 9. The other 
was to observe the failure probability of the pump necessary to 
achieve a risk reduction comparable to that achieved with the 
addition of the new valve. 
The results show that the addition of the new cutoff 
valve reduces the end state frequency of EXPLOSIONM from 
6.5 x 10~8 to 1.4 x 10~10 year-1. In order to achieve this same 
reduction in frequency of the methane explosion end state, it 
would be necessary to decrease the failure probability of the 
2
 We must iterate that this study is based on the design presented here, and 
may not reflect the true plant design. 
pump from 2.78 x 10 to 6 x 10 , which falls outside the 
90% range of certainty considered in this study. 
6. Conclusions 
Despite the major limitations and uncertainties due to the 
lack of operational experience at the complex, the results reflect 
the importance of the methane line break event and the relative 
unimportance of the fact that the plants are coupled in this event. 
Furthermore, since the total frequency of the sequences that 
could affect health has a mean value of almost 7 x 10~8 year-1, 
and the methane explosion sequences contribute almost 90% 
to this total value, it becomes apparent that the possible design 
modifications should be concentrated on the hydrogen produc-
tion plant. Since the methane explosion is the most dominant 
end state that could effect health, different modifications were 
suggested to reduce the frequency. As analyzed in this paper, 
the addition of a cutoff valve in the methane line can reduce the 
explosion frequency by two orders of magnitude. Results from 
other design changes, as well as procedural changes, such as 
placing a second operator to verify that the recirculator is shut 
down, are presented in the study's full report (Flores, 2005). It 
is necessary to perform a cost/beneflt analysis to evaluate the 
design change, given the risk reduction calculated here. Finally 
a cost-beneflt factor limit must be established for promoting 
design change for such already low accident frequencies. In 
addition, the use of end states that only affect economic risk 
can also be used for denning design changes. 
Generic failure rates were employed, and when the data did 
not exist, conservative values were used. Despite the simplifica-
tions and not taking credit for recovery, the end state frequencies 
were small. Although the the analysis is simplified, if other fac-
tors were to be considered, such as taking credit for human 
actions, component repair, etc., further reduction in frequencies 
would be expected. More plant specific data and/or data with 
less uncertainty could help to refine the analysis. 
Future work includes analyzing more initiating events, espe-
cially a detailed study of the chemical plant. Also, as mentioned 
in the events that take place in the reactor, the assumption that 
the chemical plant is unaffected will be removed in order to bet-
ter evaluate the level of affectation of the events in one plant on 
the other. In particular, the most important interface between the 
plants is the isolation valves; the inclusion of these valves in the 
PSA will determine the importance of their failures and provide 
further insight into the coupling risks. In addition, more sensitiv-
ity studies should be conducted in order to determine the impact 
of possible modifications in the design and operation of the plant. 
If the sensitivity study results in important risk reduction, the 
next step is to evaluate the cost of the modification and present 
the cost/benefit or value/impact results as a piece of information 
important to consider in the decision making process. 
Although the frequency of an accident in this complex is two 
orders of magnitude smaller than the frequency of core melt of a 
BWR, risk is never small enough, and engineers should always 
be prepared to look for design improvements in order to reduce 
risk. 
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